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Why does a theoretical physicist describe
a system from the point of view of
its mathematical symmetries instead of
performing a numerical simulation? The
researcher chooses the strategy that should
provide the most relevant information.
Nevertheless, the different strategies have
not always been available. Scientific dis-
covery has actually happened in history
thanks to the creativity of a good num-
ber of thinkers, whose insights proved
to be decisive for the developing of
new branches of science. New ways of
confronting well-posed problems may
eventually become intellectual habits of
generations of scientists, but such habits
can only develop after checking the validity
of these new perspectives.What the history
of science shows is somehow reproduced
in the learning process. “Knowing-about”
forms the heart of standard education:
students can learn and be tested on it.
But success in examinations gives lit-
tle indication of whether that knowl-
edge can be employed when required,
which is the essence of “knowing-to.”
When must a specific intellectual habit
be called upon? Knowing-to has to do
with the conscious use of cognitive habits.
It implies a conscious judgment of an
upper-level truth about the problem. The
practice of reflection is a means to help
students improve their knowing-to act
in the moment because the triggering
situation for the enactment of a new
behavioral schema must be conscious.
Thus being explicit about one’s own
thinking improves mathematics teaching
and learning (Lim and Selden, 2009).
The “aha” moment is experienced by
someone who learns a new strategy to
tackle a problem, develops a new intel-
lectual habit and knows when to use
it. This paper comments on neurosci-
entific support of the “aha” moment
through the inhibition mechanisms of the
brain.
Inhibitory control is an executive pro-
cess involved in attention, self-regulation,
and consciousness. Intelligence is closely
tied to the ability to inhibit a misleading
behavior, judgment, or strategy, and inhi-
bition is precisely the cognitivemechanism
that should allow one to redirect attention
toward logically relevant issues. It seems to
be crucial in order to validate and activate
a new mode of thinking. Houdé’s group
experimentally showed that the biased
(spatial) to logical shift in the way of solv-
ing a logical problem with geometrical
objects of different colors and shapes is a
specific consequence of executive training
in matching-bias inhibition. The relevant
point is that inhibition allows subjects
to redirect attention to the logically cor-
rect shapes, a shift process in which the
activated brain networks can change rad-
ically in the same subjects depending on
their ability to inhibit a misleading strat-
egy (Houdé et al., 2000). Posterior-to-
anterior reconfiguration of the activated
brain regions brought about by inhibitory
control might be the neural correlate of
human abstraction, the ability to break
away from perceptual biases during cogni-
tive development. Houdé’s training helps
the subject to be conscious of the implicit
mistake he or she is making and, there-
fore, what he or she must do to avoid
the trap.
Recent empirical work clarifies the
specificity of high order cognitive process
enacting inhibition. Overall, how errors
impact the processing of subsequent stim-
uli and in turn shape behavior remains
unresolved. However, the literature docu-
ments two main mechanisms when cor-
recting errors: bottom-up, automatic and
top-down, controlled forms of inhibi-
tion (Spierer et al., 2013). Actually, many
results are interpreted in terms of a shift
from a fast automatic to a slow con-
trolled form of inhibitory control induced
by the detection of errors, which could
have been caused by an attentional modu-
lation (Manuel et al., 2012). Some exper-
iments on post-error slowing in subjects
support the view that outcome expectancy
(not accuracy) is essential for such effect.
Post-error slowing is caused by attentional
orienting to unexpected events and not by
a strategic adjustment of cognitive nature
(Núñez Castellar et al., 2010). Then, there
seems to be a qualitative criterion for the
subject to decide when accuracy is impor-
tant because expectancy is not fulfilled. In
short, the subject has expectancy. He or
she looks for an adequacy with the input
signal. And he or she needs attentional
reorientation when this adequacy is not
satisfied.
Intentional inhibitory control exists
whenever the subject’s creativity and
checking of the truth (adequacy) is
required in a new problem. Deliberate
inhibition is necessary even if the sub-
ject has the proper knowledge about, but
does not know when to use it. In other
words, inhibition is an effect of detecting
error and shifting to a new cognitive strat-
egy in which awareness is necessary for
shifting from fast to slow forms of con-
trol. The role of consciousness is related
to the inhibition of the common (habit-
ual) cognitive strategy, which would allow
for the activation and recruiting of the
brain areas involved in a new type of
reasoning. But the specific “judgment of
truth” to accept or reject a new strat-
egy turns out to be an exclusive fea-
ture of consciousness. This explains, for
instance, why the validation of a math-
ematical generalization cannot initially
be a habit. Theoretical scientists must
beforehand judge the relevant strategy for
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tackling a problem and then make con-
scious use of an intellectual habit—which
might be new in the case of new theo-
retical discoveries—to try to solve it. To
sum up, human consciousness—as some-
thing different from a pure brain state—is
required in order to establish the valid-
ity of a new theoretical perspective. Once
this is reached, new habits may be at
work. Consciousness mediates between
the unconscious formation of new ideas
and the development of new habits, which
need check of the new ideas’ adequacy
in order to be prompted. Therefore, con-
sciousness is the precursor for the activa-
tion of intellectual habits.
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